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ABSTRACT
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, repeated airport closures due to potential security
breaches have imposed substantial costs on travelers, airlines, and government agencies in terms of
flight delays and cancellations. Using data from the year following September 11th, this study examines
how airlines recover flight schedules upon reopening of airports that have been closed for security
reasons. As such, this is the first study to examine service quality during irregular operations. Our results
indicate that while outcomes of flights scheduled during airport closures are difficult to explain, a
variety of factors, including potential revenue per flight and logistical variables such as flight distance,
seating capacity and shutdown severity, significantly predict outcomes of flights scheduled after airports
reopen. Given the likelihood of continued security-related airport closings, understanding the factors
that determine schedule recovery is potentially important.
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jdesimon@coba.usf.edu\Last week I announced a crackdown by special agents of the FAA and DOT's In-
spector General focused on lapses in the security system currently operated by the
airlines. Sincethen we have stopped °ights; closed, searched and reopened concourses
at nine major airports; and emptied airplanes to re-screen all passengers when we
found that the airlines' security screeners had not followed proper procedures." (U.S.
Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta, November 5, 2001).
1 Introduction
Airport security has attracted considerable attention since the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. Subsequent audits of airport security by the O±ce of Inspector General have revealed
numerous security shortcomings that haveresulted in frequent airport and terminal closures. For
instance, in the six months following September 11th, 156 terminal or concourse evacuations in
U.S. airports led to 2,395 °ight delays or cancellations (Power, 2002). Due to airport security
concerns, Congress passed the Aviation and Security Transportation Act on November 19, 2001,
to shift the burden of airline passenger security screening from private companies to the newly
created Transportation Security Agency (TSA). As of one year later, TSA had deployed federal
screeners at all 429 U. S. commercial airports.
The purpose of this paper is to determine how carriers make °ight operations decisions fol-
lowing security-related airport and terminal closures. Closures resulting from security concerns,
and subsequent reopenings, serve as a natural experiment for studying how airlines recover °ight
schedules. Since the airline industry is highly capital-intensive, carriers seek to minimize time
spent on the ground. For instance, the typical time at the gate between °ights for a Southwest
Airlines plane is just 20 minutes. A single cancellation or extended delay can cause ripple e®ects
throughout the rest of the day. Even a short closure, therefore, is bound to result in somedelays.
Furthermore, security issues can keep airportsclosed forhours, forcing hundredsof °ight cancella-
tions. Airport closures are thus costly for airlines becauseof losses in both revenue and consumer
goodwill, to the extent that airlines are blamed. Because passengers who experience delays are
more likely to switch carriers (Suzuki, 2000), these losses extend beyond the immediate impact
of the event.1 As a result, when closures occur, °ight operations personnel are under pressure to
1The loss in goodwill may be minimal if the consumers blame the Transportation Security Agency, rather than
the airline, for the security-related airport closure.
1makereal-time cancellation and delay decisions that will return theairlineto the original schedule
as quickly as possible upon reopening. From a public policy perspective, it is also interesting to
analyze how the aviation system as a whole recovers from a high-pro¯le disruption in service.2
This work is the ¯rst to empirically examine service quality during irregular operations.3
Several related studies have investigated °ight delays and cancellations under normal operating
conditions. Mayer and Sinai (2003a) ¯nd that in a given airport, hub carriers experience longer
°ight delaysthan non-hub carriers, and attributethisto theclustering of °ightsaround peak travel
times by hub airlines attempting to minimize passenger wait times between °ights. They also
report a positivee®ect of hub destination on delay, though this issmaller than thehub origination
e®ect, as well as better on-time performance in more concentrated airports. Brueckner (2003)
posits a theoretical model in which airports with one dominant carrier have fewer delays because
thedominant carrieractsas a monopolist and fully internalizesthecostsof airport congestion. He
also presents empirical results that support this prediction of the model and indicate that delays
are more frequent for °ights originating in carriers' hubs. Mazzeo (2002) ¯nds that monopolistic
routes have more frequent and longer °ight delays. Rupp, Owens and Plumly (2002) examine
scheduled arrival times and ¯nd hub carriers have both more frequent and longer delays. Yet,
hub carriers are less likely to cancel °ights to and from their hubs (Rupp and Holmes, 2003).
Rupp and Holmes also ¯nd higher cancelation rates for carriers that o®er more daily scheduled
°ights. Mayerand Sinai (2003b) also examine°ight schedules and ¯nd that carriers systematically
underestimate travel time.
We examine the impacts on service quality, in the form of °ight delays and cancellations,
of three classes of explanatory factors. Following the previously-cited literature, we estimate
regressions that include various logistical and competition measures at the airport and route
level, along with logistical factors at theaircraft, carrier, and event level. Although a few logistical
variables, such as route distance, aircraft and airport capacity, and event severity, play a role in
2We do not study weather-related airport closures because their dynamics di®er from those of security-related
closures for several reasons. While improved weather forecasting often enables airlines to adjust °ight schedules in
advance of pending bad weather, security-related closings are unanticipated. Moreover, whereas airports commonly
operate at reduced capacity levels upon reopening after a weather-induced closure, after a security problem has been
resolved airports can reopen without further capacity constraints. Finally, in contrast to severe weather events,
which are concentrated in the Northeast U.S., security breaches are geographically unconstrained and thus occur
at a random set of airports.
3For a theoretical networking-type model of irregular airline operations, see Thengvall, Bard, and Yu (2000).
2determining service quality, these two groups of variables are largely unimportant. Our third
category is a single variable of potential revenueper °ight, formed by multiplying average round-
trip airfare by the seating capacity of the plane. This study is novel in that, to our knowledge,
it is the ¯rst to study the impact of potential revenue per °ight on service quality. We ¯nd
a signi¯cant e®ect of potential revenue per °ight on whether post-shutdown °ights depart on
time and are delayed that persists even in the presence of airline ¯xed e®ects. Thus, economic
considerations matter to airlines when they attempt to recover °ight schedules after a security-
related airport or terminal closure.4
Theremainder of thepaperisorganized as follows. Thenext section discussesthedata that we
analyze. Section 3 outlinesoureconometricmodel, and section 4 presentstheresults of estimating
the model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Data
We examine how °ight schedules were recovered after 17 security-related terminal closures that
took place in the 12 months following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. We identi¯ed
airport closuresby searching the ProQuest General Reference newspaperdatabase, which includes
theWall Street Journal, New York Times, and USA Today, using keyword combinations of airport
(or terminal) and closure(or closed or shutdown or security breach). For a closure to be included,
either the entire airport had to close, as in 11 of the 17 events, or a terminal or concourse closure
had to a®ect 100 percent of a carrier's °eet, as in the other six events.5
Table I lists various details for these closures. The average closure lasts more than three
hours. Most closings are triggered by security breaches, ranging from sleeping security screeners
and unplugged metal detectors to a replica grenade found in carry-on luggage and passengers
running past security checkpoints. An FBI interrogation of three suspected terrorists closed
Chicago's Midway Airport for three and a half hours on September 14, 2001. The three major
4We consider potential revenue rather than pro¯tbecause we lackcostdata. But McCartney(2002) acknowledges
the importance of revenue considerations, noting that American Airlines \operated 14 di®erent types of jets, each
pegged for a speci¯c mission to maximize revenue."
5We exclude instances like the (November 3, 2001) evacuation of Concourse B at Baltimore-Washington In-
ternational Airport, used by Southwest Airlines, because Southwest continued °ight operations from Concourse
C.
3airports serving New York City closed for several hours on November 12, 2001, as a precautionary
measure after an American Airlines jet crashed shortly after taking o® from JFK Airport.
Our data consist primarily of individual °ight information from the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics(BTS).6 All carrierswith revenues from domesticpassenger°ights of at least onepercent
of total industry revenues are required to report on-time performance information for individual
°ights. Data are thus available for all nonstop domestic °ights for the ten largest, commonly
referred to as \major," U.S. carriers, which accounted for more than 90 percent of 2001 domestic
revenues.7 Though these major carriers arerequired to report on °ight operations in only 32 U.S.
airports, since 1995 each has reported on all domestic operations.
For each of the 17 closures, our sample includes every domestic departurescheduled by major
carriers from the time the airport closes through the rest of the day (including °ights scheduled
to depart after midnight), for a total of 2,141 °ights. About one-fourth of the sample °ights were
scheduled to depart during the closure, with remaining °ights scheduled to depart after the time
the airport reopened.
We analyze the determinants of whether °ights were canceled, delayed, or on time. This
paper adopts the Department of Transportation's convention that a °ight is considered on time
if it departs no more than 15 minutes after its scheduled departure (or after airport reopening
for °ights scheduled to depart during the closure). For each °ight, exactly one of these indicators
equals one, while the other two equal zero. Compared to the 2001 national average, after an
airport closurecancellations are six times more likely (22.6 percent versus 3.9 percent) and delays
are twice as likely in our sample. On-time departures occur for just one-fourth of the sample.
The average non-canceled °ight departs 71 minutes after its scheduled departure time.
Many of the explanatory variables in our regression analysis are likewise taken or constructed
from the BTS data. These include four measures that represent the level of competition between
carriers at the airport or on the route in question. Two of these are binary indicators of whether
the °ight originates from or is destined for a carrier's hub. The third is a measure of airport
concentration, which equalstheHer¯ndahl index (sumof thesquared carriersharesasapercentage
6The BTS data are available at http://www.bts.gov/oai/.
7These are Alaska, America West, American, Continental, Delta, Northwest, Southwest, Trans World (through
December 31, 2001), United and US Airways.
4of all daily °ights) at theairport. Theinclusion of thesethreevariablesis motivated by the¯nding
of Morrison and Winston (1989) that consumerdemand is higherforairlines with largeoperations
from an origin city. Thefourth competition variablerepresentsthenumber of e®ectivecompetitors
on a given route. This variable, discussed in Morrison and Winston (1995), is the inverse of the
sum of the squared market shares (as a percentage of all daily °ights) on the route.8
We also include a variety of logistical measures as explanatory variables in the regressions.
Several of these also come from the BTS data. Four U.S. airports are slot-controlled (a regulated
number of takeo®sand landings) during the sampleperiod: NY LaGuardia, NY JFK, Washington
Reagan National, and Chicago O'Hare.9 Two binary variables, indicating whether one of these
airports was the origin or destination airport, arecontrolled forin theregressions. Four additional
variables relating to the scheduled departure time of the °ight are also included: the time (in
hours) until the next scheduled departure for the same carrier and route, an indicator of whether
the °ight is the last °ight of the day for that carrier and route, the time (in hours) until the
airport reopens(for °ights scheduled during the closure), and thetime(in hours) elapsed between
the reopening of the airport and the scheduled departure (for °ights scheduled after the closure).
Finally, we control for the total number of °ights for the carrier that were scheduled to depart
during the shutdown.
To these data we merge information from three additional sources. From the 2001 FAA
Airport Capacity Benchmark Report, weobtain information on airport capacity, measured as the
number of additional (or fewer) °ights that would have to be scheduled at a given time interval
(in 15 minute increments) for the airport to operate exactly at capacity. From this measure and
information on the number of °ights scheduled during the closure, we calculate the number of
hours after reopening that the airport would have to operate at capacity in order to clear the
backlog of scheduled departures.10 This variable, which is speci¯c to the closure and the time of
day at 15 minute intervals, is included in the regression equations as a measure of the severity of
8An alternative measure, the route market share for the carrier on the day of the airport closure, performs
similarly.
9Our variables account for the elimination of slot restrictions at O'Hare as of July 1, 2002.
10For example, if 14 °ights were scheduled during a closure, and the airport that had closed was scheduled to
operate at two °ights below capacity in each 15 minute interval for the remainder of the day, the airport could
accommodate two additional °ights each 15 minutes, so that it would take 7 such intervals, or 1.75 hours, to clear
the backlog of °ights that could not depart during the closure.
5the airport shutdown.11
The FAA Aircraft Registry databasecontains the number of seats in each type of aircraft. We
match this by the tail number of the aircraft scheduled to make each °ight and include it as a
regressor.
Finally, for each pair of origination and destination airports, we obtain the °ight mileage
between theairports and averageround trip farein 2001 from the Department of Transportation's
Origin and Destination Survey.12 The distance measure is included as an explanatory variable in
the regressions. We multiply the average round trip fare by the number of seats in the aircraft to
obtain the potential revenue per round trip °ight, which serves as the main economic variable in
our analysis.
Summary statistics appear in TableII. Flight mileageaverages889and variesfrom 72 (Denver-
Colorado Springs) to 4,962 (Newark-Honolulu). Upon reopening, airports would have to operate
at capacity for an average of nearly 3.5 hours in order to clear the queue of departures scheduled
during closures. Means of 178 for seating capacity and $196 for round trip airfare lead to an
average potential revenue per round trip °ight of $34,871, which represents the mean revenue
lost to a carrier from canceling a full °ight and refunding the round trip airfare to ticketed
passengers. The average time until the next °ight on the same route by the same carrier is 2.6
hours. Two-thirds of scheduled °ights originate from a carrier's hub airport while one-third have
hub destinations.13 Slot-controlled originations and destinations comprise 12 and 10 percent,
respectively, of the sample. On average, routes have 1.5 e®ective competitors and the departure
airport concentration is 0.51.
Figure 1 plots the proportion of °ights that are canceled, delayed, and on time for each of
three periods: before, during, and after theairport closures. These periods correspond to the left,
middle, and right segments of the ¯gure, respectively. Because airport closures occur at various
times of day and last for varying amounts of time, we divide each period of each event into
quintiles and, after combining the data across events, calculate mean outcomes for each quintile
11We set this variable equal to zero for all °ights from Chicago Midway and Louisville, because these two airports
are not are not among the nation's 31 busiest and therefore are not included in the aforementioned FAA capacity
report.
12The survey can be accessed at http://ostpxweb.ost.dot.gov/aviation/aptcomp/aptcomp2001.htm.
13The sample consists of four possible types of routings: hub to hub (219 °ights, or 10%), non-hub to hub (522,
24%), hub to non-hub (1,225, 57%), and non-hub to non-hub (175, 8%).
6of each period. For example, quintiles of the during-shutdown period consist of 42 minutes for
Chicago Midway, which closed for 210 minutes, but only 20 minutes for Denver International,
which closed for 100 minutes.
Despite the normalization process, clear service quality patterns emerge within each of the
three periods. Before the shutdowns, 81 percent of °ights depart on time, slightly more than the
2001 averageof 73 percent for domestic°ights by majorcarriers. This suggeststhat airports oper-
ated understandard conditionsbeforesecurity breachesoccurred. Not surprisingly, closures result
in a sharp jump in the °ight cancellation rate, from ¯ve percent in the last pre-shutdown quintile
to 40 percent in the ¯rst during-shutdown quintile. Though cancellations decrease somewhat for
°ights scheduled during the later portions of shutdowns, the mean during-shutdown cancellation
rate of 42 percent is more than ten times the 2001 average of 3.9 percent. Moreover, the decline
in cancellations for °ights scheduled later in the closure period is associated with a large rise in
delays that results in a decrease in the proportion of °ights that depart on time (i.e., within 15
minutes after the airport reopens). Upon airport reopening, the cancellation rate immediately
falls to twelve percent, which is close to the pre-closure average rate of six percent. Meanwhile,
the delay rate peaks in the ¯rst quintile and declines monotonically thereafter, while the on-time
departure rate climbs steadily throughout the post-shutdown period.
Since our goal is to examine how °ight schedules are recovered after a service disruption, we
ignore °ights that departed (or were scheduled to depart) before airports were closed and focus
on the periods during and after airport closures. Figure 1 suggests that outcomes patterns for
these two periods di®er considerably. As a consequence, we separately analyze °ights scheduled
to depart during and after airport shutdowns.14 The patterns displayed in Figure 1, particularly
regarding cancellation rates for °ights scheduled during and after airport closures, also determine
an important aspect of the econometric speci¯cation, to which we now turn.
14Formal speci¯cation tests unequivocally reject pooling of data from these two periods.
73 Econometric Model
Consider the pro¯t maximization problem facing the agent managing air tra±c for a representa-
tive airline on the day of a security-related airport closure.15 From the time the airport closes
until sometime after airport reopening, the agent is typically confronted with an excess of °ights
scheduled relative to thenumber that can feasibly depart. Of course, during the airport shutdown
no °ights are allowed to depart. This creates a backlog of schedule departures once an airport (or
terminal) reopens. The agent must integrate the °ights that were scheduled to depart during the
airport closure with the°ights that werescheduled to depart after theairport reopening given the
existing airport capacity limitations. Frequently after an airport closure, the backlog of scheduled
departures exceeds the number of opportunities for °ights to depart at the current time. The
agent thus must decide between three possible outcomes for each a®ected °ight: cancellation,
delay, or on-time departure.
A choice set consisting of three discrete outcomes suggests the use of a discrete choice econo-
metric model. Suppose that the (net future discounted) pro¯t from °ight i having outcome j,
incorporating both short-term (e.g., rebooking costs) and long-term (e.g., service quality reputa-
tion) e®ects can be represented as
¼i(j) =¼j(Xi) +"ij (1)
where for outcome j, ¼j(Xi) is a deterministic function of pro¯ts from the vector of observable
characteristics Xi of °ight i. Assuming that ¼j(Xi) can be approximated by a linear function of
Xi, the pro¯t function becomes
¼i(j) = Xi¯j +"ij (2)
where "ij represents unobserved factors that in°uence pro¯t. For example, the pro¯t from °ight
i being canceled is
15Discussions with airline personnel indicate that security personnel determine whether an airport is opened or
closed, while airlines decide whether an individual °ight departs on-time, late, or is canceled. The only exception
is at slot-controlled airports, where carriers that fail to use a departure slot are forced to cancel the °ight.
8¼i(CANCEL) = Xi¯CANCEL +"i;CANCEL (3)
Assume (for the moment) that each "ij is independent and drawn from an identical Weibull
distribution. Then the choice of which outcome j maximizes pro¯t for °ight i, as represented in
equation (2), is equivalent to the conventional multinomial logit model (Domencich and McFad-
den, 1975),





where identi¯cation requires ¯k ´ 0 for one of the three outcomes. A well-known embedded
assumption of the multinomial logit model is the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA):
the ratio of any two outcome choice probabilities is independent of whether the third option
is available. For instance, if for a particular °ight the probability of each outcome is 1/3, the
elimination of one option (e.g., departing on time) implies that the probability of each of the
other two outcomes (e.g., delay and cancellation) is 1/2, so that the ratio of these probabilities
remains equal to one.
The IIA assumption might be unreasonably restrictive. An alternative discrete choice speci¯-
cation that relaxes the IIA assumption is thenested logit model. One way to motivatethe nested
logit model in ourcontext is by postulating that thedecision between thesethreeoutcomesoccurs
as a sequence of two binary choices: the ¯rst option is either chosen or not chosen, and if the ¯rst
option is bypassed, then one of the other two options is chosen.16 Examples of the two feasible
sequencing possibilitiesare displayed in Figure2. In theleft panel, labeled Decision Process 1, the
agent ¯rst decides whether to cancel the°ight. Then, for °ightsnot canceled, shedecideswhether
the °ight should depart on time or be delayed. In the right panel, labeled Decision Process 2,
the agent ¯rst decides whether the °ight should depart on time, and then, for °ights that do not
depart on time, she decides whether the °ight will be delayed or canceled.17
16The nested logit model does not require a sequential decision process: an econometrically equivalent interpre-
tation is that the decision between the three outcomes occurs at one time, but the errors are heteroskedastic. The
sequential decision interpretation, however, is natural in this context.
17It seems unlikely that the third possible ordering, in which the agent ¯rst decides whether to delay and then
decides whether non-delayed °ights depart on time or are canceled, would represent a rational decision process.
9Next we outline the econometric method involved in estimating the nested logit model in the
case of Decision Process 1 (the method for Decision Process 2 is analogous). De¯ne the inclusive





Calculating the probability of choosing each outcome j is now a three-step process18:
1. Conditional on not canceling, the probability that a °ight is on time (rather than delayed)
is estimated equivalently to a standard (binary choice) logit using only the non-canceled
°ights:




The ¯rst term in the denominator is simpli¯ed by the normalization that ¯DELAYED equals
0.






3. The probability that the °ight is canceled (rather than not canceled) is estimated equiva-
lently to a standard logit model for thedecision between canceling and not canceling (either
delaying or having the °ight depart on time), augmented by an additive inclusive valueterm
in the exponential expressions in both the numerator and denominator:
Pri( CANCEL ) =
eXi¯CANCEL+¿Ii
1+eXi¯CANCEL+¿Ii (8)
This is the standard logit model for cancel vs. \other" with the additional inclusive value
term.
18For more details regarding these steps, see Greene (2000).
10The unconditional probabilities of on-time and delayed departureare straightforward to com-










along with standard errors that are estimated by 100 replications of a non-parametric bootstrap.
The question remains whether Decision Process 1 or 2 in Figure 2 more closely re°ects the
actual decision sequencing that airlineagentsutilize for°ights scheduled during and aftersecurity-
related airport closures. The choice between these two processes for each of the two periods,
during and after the shutdowns, is driven by theory and supported empirically. In theory, one
might expect that oncean airport reopens, carriers would attempt to adhere as closely as possible
to their original timetables for °ights that were not yet scheduled to depart and thus had not
(yet) been delayed or canceled. But maintaining the post-shutdown °ight schedule would require
limiting thenumberof °ights originally scheduled during theshutdown, and thus already delayed,
to be rescheduled after airport reopening. This implies that Decision Process 1 applies to °ights
scheduled during theshutdown, asairlines must ¯rst decidewhich °ights to attempt to reschedule
while minimizing the impact on post-shutdown °ights not yet a®ected, and then ¯nd a slot in
which to send o® the rescheduled °ights. In contrast, Decision Process 2 would govern °ights
scheduled after airport reopening: °ights that could not depart on time would be delayed with
the intent to eventually depart if possible.
The patterns depicted in Figure 1 are consistent with these conjectures. The uniformly higher
rates of cancellation for °ights during airport closures, coupled with the virtually immediate re-
turn to pre-closure cancellation rates upon reopening, implies that di®erent decision processes are
used for °ights scheduled during and after closures. The fact that cancellation rates are substan-
tially higher than pre-closure rates, and cancellation rates exceed delay rates for the majority of
the closure period, is consistent with the premise that the cancellation decision is made before
the delay decision for °ights scheduled during closures.19 Meanwhile, the combination of low
19Moreover, by canceling °ights scheduled to depart during closures, carriers minimize customer dissatisfaction
if passengers blame the security breach rather than the carriers for the closure.
11cancellation rates and only gradual decline of the delay rate as the on-timerate increases towards
its pre-closure level upon airport reopening suggests that °ights scheduled after closures are only
canceled after the decision not to depart them on time. This logic implies that Decision Process
2 is the \natural" order of the delay vs. cancellation decision that is followed during normal
operations.
Ideally, we could con¯rm our hypotheses regarding which decision process governs each pe-
riod by estimating the nested logit model implied by both decision orderings and comparing the
performance of the two. There is, however, no easily-constructed criterion by which to choose
between two non-nested models. Since the log-likelihoods of the regressions are informative in
some cases, we present these, along with the log-likelihood of the more restrictive multinomial
logit model, for each speci¯cation in Tables III and IV, which are discussed below.20
4 Results
4.1 Flights scheduled during shutdowns
Table III displays results for the nested logit model with the cancellation decision preceding the
delay decision for °ightsscheduled during airport shutdowns. Speci¯cation (2), in theright panel,
includes airline ¯xed e®ects, while speci¯cation (1), in the left panel, does not. For each model,
the bottom panel shows that the log likelihood of the alternative feasible nested logit model, in
which the on-time decision is made before the cancellation decision, is statistically identical to
that of the multinomial logit model, while the log likelihood for the models estimated in Table
III represent signi¯cant improvements over those of the multinomial logit models. This provides
further empirical support for our hypothesized decision ordering during the shutdown period.
Although adding airline ¯xed e®ects substantially improves the¯t of the model, speci¯cations
(1) and (2) yield similar results. In each, carriers appear to make cancellation decisions with
regard to only a few competitive and logistical factors. Notably, potential revenue per °ight does
20For both the during and after closure periods, results for both the alternative feasible nested logit and multi-
nomial logit models are comparable to those presented in Tables III and IV. Nested logit coe±cients and standard
errors (as opposed to the marginal e®ects shown in Tables III and IV) are available upon request. Furthermore,
as an alternative robustness test, we applied the discrete factor method (Heckman and Singer, 1984) to the multi-
nomial logit model. This method speci¯es a discrete approximation to the error structure rather than assuming a
speci¯c form. Results are quite similar to those reported below and are also available upon request.
12not havea signi¯cant e®ect on cancellations or delays of °ights scheduled during airport closures.
Two competitive variables are signi¯cant determinants of cancellations and delays during
shutdowns, though only in the presence of airline ¯xed e®ects. Flights destined for a hub airport
of the airline are 18 percentage points less likely to be canceled and 19 percentage points more
likely to be delayed. Since a majority of passengers make connections at a hub (Morrison and
Winston, 1995), canceling hub destination °ights is more inconvenient for connecting passengers
and potentially more costly for airlines since tickets must be reissued for each missed connection.
Hub destination cancellations also increase the probability that connecting passengers do not
maketheir destinationson thescheduled day, which is clearly a majorinconvenience. In addition,
after an airport closure (which averages over three hours) and subsequent °ight delay (which
averages over an hour), some °ight crews might be approaching the 16 hour on-duty limit. Since
replacement crews are more accessible at hubs, carriers have an incentive to not cancel hub
destination °ights, or at least might be more able to avoid such cancellations.
In contrast, an additional e®ective competitor on a route increases cancellations by eight
percentage points while reducing delays by seven percentage points. Both pairs of e®ects, partic-
ularly that for destination hubs, are large relative to the during-shutdown averages of 42 percent
for both °ight cancellations and delays. Similar ¯ndings have been documented by Rupp and
Holmes (2003) and Rupp, Owens and Plumly (2003). A potential explanation is that excess ca-
pacity increases with the competitors on a route, enabling carriers to more e®ectively consolidate
°ights.21
In both speci¯cations, two logistical variables signi¯cantly a®ect cancellation and delay deci-
sions. As °ight distance increases by 500 miles, thelikelihood of cancellations decreases, and that
of delays increases, by about nine percentage points when airline ¯xed e®ects are included. A
potential reason that cancellations of longer distance °ights might hurt schedule recovery e®orts
is the limited interchangeability of °ight crews across plane types used to °y routes of various
lengths. Since there are many more short-haul than long-haul °ights, fewer substitute crews are
available for the latter.22 Another possibility is that this result arises from the mandate that
21Morrison and Winston (2000) report that it is common, in response to new entrants onto a route, for the
incumbent major carrier to not only reduce fares but to also increase capacity.
22For example, according to Continental personnel, a DC9-30 aircraft can substitute for a Boeing 737-200 but
not for a MD-80 or a Boeing 737-300, and a Boeing 737-300 can substitute for a Boeing 737-200 while the reverse
13°ights cannot leave the gate when it is known that the expected °ight time will result in pi-
lots exceeding the maximum 16 hours during which they can remain on duty. Longer distance
°ights will be more likely to encounter the constraint than shorter distance °ights, and locating
a replacement crew may disproportionately delay longer °ights.23
Also, for every additional hour that an airport is closed after the scheduled departure, cancel-
lation is seven percentagepoints morelikely while delay is eight percentage points less likely. This
suggests that carriers cancel °ights scheduled early in the shutdown period and re-book displaced
passengers onto later °ights.
A third logistical variable, thenumberof seats in theaircraft, signi¯cantly increasesthechance
of delay when airline e®ects are excluded, yet the signi¯cance is wiped away with the inclusion of
airline e®ects.
Overall, the results suggest that in the struggle to maintain °ight schedules after an unex-
pected airport shutdown, airlines make decisions regarding °ights scheduled during the shutdown
that are a®ected to some extent by certain competitive and logistical factors that are essential to
minimizing disruptions but are otherwise somewhat haphazard. Interestingly, the e®ects for each
signi¯cant variable appear to represent a virtual one-to-one transfer between cancellation and
delay, with no e®ect on the on-time departures (this includes the number of seats, although the
cancellation e®ect is insigni¯cant). This pattern provides further evidence that cancellation deci-
sions are made ¯rst for °ights scheduled during shutdowns, with °ights more vital to maintaining
the schedules of airlines and customers being delayed rather than canceled.
4.2 Flights scheduled after an airport reopens
Table IV displays results for the nested logit model with the on-time decision preceding the
cancellation decision for °ights scheduled to depart after an airport reopens. Analogous to the
previous table, speci¯cation (3) in the left panel omits airline ¯xed e®ects while speci¯cation (4)
in the right panel includes them. The lower panel again reveals that both nested logit models ¯t
the data signi¯cantly better than the multinomial logit model. While the log likelihood of the
is not allowed (Thengvall, Yu and Bard, 2001).
23The 16 hour limit was introduced by the FAA's \Whitlow letter" of November 2000. We thank an anonymous
United Airlines pilot for bringing this to our attention.
14speci¯cation (3) model is substantially greater than is that of the alternative feasible nested logit
model, thespeci¯cation (4) log likelihood is not signi¯cantly di®erent from that of thealternative
nested model (\Cancel" 1st).
The main result from this table is that for °ights scheduled to depart after the shutdown
ends, potential revenuea®ects service quality in a predictablemanner. Though potential revenue
does not impact the cancellation decision, it does signi¯cantly increase thelikelihood that a °ight
departs on time rather than late. Without airline ¯xed e®ects, a $10,000 increase in potential
revenue increases the probability that a °ight departs on time by seven percentage points (or 14
percent), with an o®setting e®ect on the probability of delay (of 17 percent). With airline ¯xed
e®ectsadded, the impact of potential revenueon thelikelihoods of on-time and delayed departure
are roughly halved, but still statistically signi¯cant.
This result shows that economicconsiderationsimpact schedule recovery strategies. Thereare
likely both short and long-term elements to the relationship between potential revenue and service
quality. Carriers can avoid costly reimbursements to passengers who abort their trips because
of service disruption by avoiding delays on higher revenue °ights.24 Perhaps more importantly,
Suzuki (2000) reports that passengers are more likely to switch carriers after experiencing °ight
delays. To the extent that current high-revenue °ight passengers will °y with the carrier in
the future, carriers have an incentive to minimize high-revenue °ight delays in order to keep
high-revenue °ight passengers from becoming dissatis¯ed and switching carriers. Moreover, given
the similarities between pre- and post-shutdown service quality patterns (as displayed in Figure
1), this result suggests that economic factors play a role in decisions regarding the delay and
cancellation of °ights under standard operating conditions.
Competition appears to haveonly a small impact on schedule recovery after airport reopening.
Increased airport concentration results in cancellations of °ights that would otherwise depart on
time, with a one-tenth point increase in airport concentration (roughly the di®erence between
Denver International, 0.55, and Chicago Midway, 0.66) increasing the cancellation rate by seven
percentage points. This suggests that when the bulk of °ights a®ected by a shutdown are for a
24On September 25, 2001, Norman Strickland, Assistant Director for the O±ce of Aviation Enforcement
and Proceedings, opined that \refunds should be provided upon request to passengers who wish to cancel
their trips as a result of a °ight cancellation or signi¯cant schedule change made by the carrier" (aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/rules/20010925.htm).
15single carrier, service quality su®ers, as airline personnel (e.g. gate agents) are scarce resources
that constrain the recovery ability of carriers with a large airport presence. But these e®ects are
not robust to the addition of airline indicators. Similar to during shutdowns, °ying to a hub has
an e®ect only when airline e®ects are included. In contrast to the during-shutdown case, °ights
destined for hubs are less likely to be on time.
Carriers confront a trade-o® between cancellations and °ight delays with fewer cancellations
during an airport shutdown contributing to more°ight delays after an airport reopens. Logistical
variables aremore important for°ights scheduled after reopening than for those scheduled during
shutdowns. The e®ect of distance, particularly compared to that in theprevious table, is reminis-
cent of that just discussed for °ying to a hub, except that it holds whether or not airline e®ects
are included. In particular, longer distance °ights are again more likely to be delayed, but the
delayed °ights are ones that would otherwise have been on time, rather than canceled as was the
case for °ights scheduled during shutdowns. Mazzeo (2002) reports better on-time arrival rates
for longer °ights, which suggests that pilots can make up time while airborne in order to at least
partially o®set a delayed departure. This pattern suggests that certain types of °ights | to a
hub and long-distance | must depart in order to maintain °ight schedules.
Both with and without airline¯xed e®ects, planes with greaterseating capacity are morelikely
to be delayed at the expense of departing on time. An additional 100 aircraft seats reduces the
probability of an on-time departure by 9-14 percentage points and raises the probability of delay
by 13-16 percentage points. This might be merely because larger planes take longer to load. For
instance, United Airlines has adopted a \departure on ready" policy that takes precedence over
the actual schedule.25 If this policy is followed after a security breach, smaller planes, which load
morequickly, should push back and thustakeo®beforelargerplanes upon airport reopening. The
lack of both robustness of this e®ect and o®setting declinein the on-timeratefor °ightsscheduled
during airport shutdowns provides further evidence that the decision process di®ers during and
after the shutdown.
With increases in shutdown severity relative to airport capacity, as measured by the number of
airport capacity operation hours to clear the queue of °ights backlogged from the closure, °ights
25See http://aerosite.net/tower.htm.
16are less likely to leave on schedule and more likely to be delayed, regardless of airline ¯xed e®ects
inclusion. The on-time e®ect is larger in magnitude than the delay e®ect because some °ights
that would otherwise depart on time are instead canceled, but this increase in cancellations is no
longer signi¯cant when airline e®ects are included.
Several additional logistical factors matter. As each hour passes after airport reopening,
airports gradually revert to normal operations, with more °ights departing on time and fewer
being delayed or canceled, though only theon-time e®ect is robust to theinclusion of airline ¯xed
e®ects. The last °ight of theday is more likely to depart on time and less likely to be delayed (in
theabsence of airline¯xed e®ects), showing that operationsgenerally return to normal by the end
of the day. Getting this last °ight to its destination also allows carriers to set themselves up for
normal operations the following day. The harder a carrier is hit by the shutdown, as represented
by the number of °ights by the carrier that were scheduled during the airport closure, the more
likely that the carrier will have to cancel a post-shutdown °ight. As the length of time until the
next carrier/destination-speci¯c °ight increases, the probability of delay increases when airline
¯xed e®ects are included. Finally, when the closed airport is slot-controlled, delays are less likely
while cancellations and on-time departures are more likely, an apparent contradiction possibly
explained by the fact that slot holders have a limited time (30-60 minutes) to get °ights airborne
before they must be canceled. But airline indicators render all three of these e®ects insigni¯cant.
5 Conclusion
Since September 11, 2001, many airports have been closed because of security breaches. These
closures have provided a natural experiment on how airlines recover °ight schedules following
a major service disruption. The data reveal substantially di®erent patterns in service quality
for °ights scheduled during and after airport shutdowns. Carriers ultimately cancel nearly half
of °ights scheduled during airport shutdowns. Consequently, only a few variables a®ect the
performances of these °ights: hub destination, route competition, timing of scheduling during the
shutdown, and °ight distance.
In correspondence with improved service quality that ensues upon airport reopening, several
17additional factors a®ect departure performance of °ights scheduled after closures end. Notably,
°ight-speci¯c potential revenue has no impact on departures scheduled during shutdowns, but
impactsperformancein a predictableway for°ightsscheduled afterairports reopen. In particular,
°ights with higher potential revenue are signi¯cantly more likely to depart on time and less likely
to be delayed. Once normalcy begins to return to airport operations, economic considerations
play an important role in °ight schedule recoveries following security-related airport closures.
Moreover, though route competition no longer matters, hub destination and °ight timing and
distance continue to have an e®ect, and several logistical variables that were inconsequential for
°ights scheduled during shutdowns become relevant.
Both airports and the Transportation Security Agency have taken steps to prevent future
security breaches and reduce the impacts of those that do occur. The Aviation and Security
Transportation Act reassigned the responsibility for airport safety from private companies to the
federal government in an e®ort to improvesafety and minimizethepossibility of a breach. Airport
security managers are now required to obtain permission from supervisors before evacuating con-
courses following a breach (Morrison, 2002). And Los Angeles International Airport, for example,
has created many separate and smaller security zones within its airport by closing some tunnels
that connect terminals. Still, Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta's \zero-tolerance" policy
towards airport security lapses suggests that security-related airport closures will continue to oc-
cur. The results of this study provide insight into the factors dictating °ight schedule recovery
following such closures.
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22Table I: U.S. Airport and Terminal Closures due to Security Breaches during the twelve months following September 11th, 2001.
Percent Average
Length of During  Percent Percent Delay
3




Canceled (minutes) Shutdown Reason
9/14/2001 Chicago (MDW) 3:29 79 42% 75% 24% 136.9      FBI questions three suspected terrorists.
11/1/2001 New York (JFK) 0:49 13 23% 69% 8% 73.3        Screeners not following proper procedure.
11/12/2001 New York (JFK) 9:47 66 89% 33% 55% 52.8        AA Flight 587 crashes in Queens, NY.
11/12/2001 Newark (EWR) 5:12 197 41% 45% 39% 67.1        AA Flight 587 crashes in Queens, NY.
11/12/2001 New York (LGA) 5:25 176 47% 14% 55% 18.1        AA Flight 587 crashes in Queens, NY.
11/16/2001 Atlanta (ATL) 3:43 405 31% 53% 45% 186.0      Passenger runs past security checkpoint.
11/24/2001 Seattle (SEA) 2:45 165 21% 79% 1% 69.5        Unplugged metal detector.
12/18/2001 Charlotte (CLT)  1:48 233 19% 52% 25% 75.8        Unplugged metal detector.
12/18/2001 Baltimore (BWI) 2:32 22 45% 64% 0% 39.0        Suspicious image on X-ray scanner.
2/19/2002 Louisville (SDF) 2:21 45 24% 38% 0% 21.2        Sleeping security screener.
2/24/2002 Salt Lake City (SLC) 3:07 15 100% 73% 7% 61.5        Luggage-screening machine malfunction.
2/28/2002 Los Angeles (LAX) 1:50 151 15% 69% 1% 56.9        Metal detector malfunction.
3/4/2002 Los Angeles (LAX) 3:00 30 13% 43% 7% 39.1        Grenade found in carry-on luggage.
5/12/2002 Cincinnati (CVG) 2:37 117 9% 35% 2% 18.2        Passenger claims to have small knife.
6/29/2002 Washington (IAD) 2:13 11 82% 73% 0% 40.5        Passenger with a knife clears security.
7/27/2002 Los Angeles (LAX) 2:07 73 36% 73% 4% 80.2        Man bypasses security checkpoint.
8/26/2002 Denver (DEN) 1:49 343 10% 49% 1% 35.2        Woman bypasses security screening.
Total 3:12 2141 28% 51% 22.6% 71.4       
1
Length of closure is denoted as hours:minutes.
2
Flight delay and cancellation numbers are only for the ten major domestic carriers: America West, American Airlines, Alaska, Continental, Delta,
 Northwest, Southwest, TWA (before 12/31/2001), United, US Airways.
3
Average departure delay (minutes) is the difference between actual and scheduled departure time minus the unavoidable length of closure delay.
Canceled flights are excluded in this departure delay calculation.
23Table II: Summary Statistics for Scheduled Flights During U.S. Airport and Terminal Closures (n = 2,141)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Percent canceled 0.226 0.418 0 1
Percent delayed 0.513 0.500 0 1
Percent on-time 0.261 0.439 0 1
Potential Revenue per Flight ($1,000's) 34.871 18.891 4.353 138.166
Distance (100's miles) 8.889 6.341 0.72 49.62
Seats in aircraft (100's) 1.779 0.573 0.160 4.950
Hours to clear queue  3.461 2.623 0 8.5
Hours after reopening before scheduled departure
1
1.966 1.647 0.017 9.733
Hours until next flight 2.629 1.873 0.017 15.333
Last flight of day 0.304 0.460 0 1
Number of Flights Shutdown for Carrier  33.750 34.936 0 106
Origination slot 0.119 0.324 0 1
Destination slot 0.096 0.294 0 1
Origination hub 0.674 0.469 0 1
Destination hub 0.346 0.476 0 1
Airport concentration (at departure) 0.514 0.235 0.213 0.838
Effective competitors (on route) 1.468 0.591 1 4
Departure Delay
2
 (minutes) 71.406 83.064 -12 573
Airport market share of largest carrier (percent) 0.668 0.234 0.269 0.914
1
For flights scheduled to departure after airport reopens.
2
Departure delay excludes flight cancellations.
24Table III: Marginal Eects: Flights Scheduled During Airport Shutdown|\Cancel" 1st Decision
Model (1) (2)
Outcome Cancel Delayed On-time Cancel Delayed On-time
Potential Revenue per Flight (1000's) 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Logistical Variables
Distance (100's Miles) -0.011* 0.017** -0.006 -0.017** 0.019** -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Seats in Aircraft (100's) -0.102 0.138* -0.036 -0.069 0.085 -0.016
(0.061) (0.057) (0.034) (0.065) (0.061) (0.030)
Hours to Clear Queue 0.048 -0.034 -0.014 0.069 -0.047 -0.022
(0.027) (0.022) (0.015) (0.048) (0.043) (0.013)
Hours After Scheduled Departure 0.070** -0.078** 0.008 0.059** -0.057** -0.003
Before Airport Reopening (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012)
Hours Until Next Flight 0.004 -0.008 0.004 0.005 -0.006 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004)
Last Flight of Day -0.000 -0.069 0.069 0.046 -0.056 0.009
(0.071) (0.077) (0.039) (0.082) (0.082) (0.028)
Number of Flights 0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000
Shutdown for Carrier (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Origination Slot 0.354 -0.384 0.031 0.318 -0.340 0.022
(0.373) (0.425) (0.074) (0.230) (0.236) (0.053)
Destination Slot 0.029 -0.043 0.014 0.022 -0.024 0.002
(4.829) (3.394) (1.474) (3.997) (2.838) (1.203)
Competition Variables
Origination Hub -0.064 0.117 -0.053 -0.103 0.133 -0.029
(0.142) (0.142) (0.045) (0.207) (0.190) (0.054)
Destination Hub -0.105 0.132 -0.027 -0.176* 0.186** -0.010
(0.076) (0.071) (0.034) (0.070) (0.068) (0.031)
Airport Concentration 0.322 -0.199 -0.123 0.586 -0.216 -0.371
(0.560) (0.320) (0.324) (0.428) (0.396) (0.201)
Eective Competitors 0.058 -0.052 -0.006 0.082* -0.073* -0.009
(0.038) (0.036) (0.018) (0.038) (0.036) (0.019)
Airline Fixed Eects? No Yes
Sample Average 41.6% 41.8% 16.6% 41.6% 41.8% 16.6%
Log-likelihood -358.40 -318.60
N 609 609
Log-likelihood (MNL) -360.13 -337.67
Log-likelihood (On-time 1st) -360.06 -337.57
Cell entries are estimated marginal eects with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
**: Signicant at 1%; *: Signicant at 5%
\Log-likelihood (MNL)" is the classical multinomimal logit model which imposes independence of irrelevant
alternatives.
25Table IV: Marginal Eects: After Airport Reopens | \Ontime" 1st Decision
Model (3) (4)
Outcome Cancel Delayed On-time Cancel Delayed On-time
Potential Revenue per Flight (1000's) 0.001 -0.007** 0.007** -0.000 -0.003* 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Logistical Variables
Distance (100's Miles) 0.001 0.012** -0.014** -0.003 0.018** -0.015**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Seats in Aircraft (100's) -0.017 0.155** -0.138** -0.036 0.127** -0.091*
(0.035) (0.043) (0.041) (0.030) (0.037) (0.039)
Hours to Clear Queue 0.035** 0.045* -0.080** 0.018 0.045* -0.063**
(0.013) (0.020) (0.015) (0.013) (0.022) (0.019)
Hours After Reopening -0.013** -0.025** 0.038** -0.014 -0.012 0.026**
Before Scheduled Departure (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Hours Until Next Flight -0.006 0.005 0.001 -0.008 0.024* -0.016
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Last Flight of Day 0.005 -0.087* 0.083* -0.022 -0.055 0.077*
(0.024) (0.036) (0.035) (0.023) (0.041) (0.036)
Number of Flights 0.002** 0.002 -0.003 0.003** 0.003 -0.005
Shutdown for Carrier (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Origination Slot 0.236* -0.821* 0.585* 0.029 -0.276 0.248
(0.115) (0.332) (0.241) (0.094) (0.172) (0.204)
Destination Slot -0.001 0.033 -0.032 0.029 -0.015 -0.014
(0.022) (0.054) (0.044) (0.023) (0.043) (0.041)
Competition Variables
Origination Hub 0.042 0.032 -0.074 -0.062 0.156 -0.094
(0.057) (0.053) (0.059) (0.103) (0.126) (0.119)
Destination Hub 0.038 -0.026 -0.012 0.002 0.070 -0.072*
(0.026) (0.042) (0.034) (0.028) (0.041) (0.035)
Airport Concentration 0.718** 0.076 -0.794** 0.073 0.224 -0.297
(0.147) (0.180) (0.203) (0.195) (0.224) (0.169)
Eective Competitors 0.002 -0.035 0.032 -0.018 0.038 -0.020
(0.025) (0.031) (0.023) (0.022) (0.030) (0.024)
Airline Fixed Eects? No Yes
Sample Average 9.9% 40.3% 49.8% 9.9% 40.3% 49.8%
Log-likelihood -1,171.47 -1,099.03
N 1532 1532
Log-likelihood (MNL) -1,179.15 -1,100.43
Log-likelihood (Cancel 1st) -1,175.25 -1,098.02
Cell entries are estimated marginal eects with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.
**: Signicant at 1%; *: Signicant at 5%
\Log-likelihood (MNL)" is the classical multinomimal logit model which imposes independence of irrelevant
alternatives.
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